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Abstract
Empirical results show that children from high income households
achieve higher levels of education and are more likely to be enrolled in post
compulsory school. Theoretical ￿ndings fail to answer clearly whether
greater public investment in the higher education system e⁄ectively de-
creases the inequality between the educational attainment of rich and poor
children. We show that if the child receives a monetary transfer from his
parents and allocates it between private consumption and investment in
private additional education, then a further public investment decreases
the educational gap. This result holds under the assumptions of both sub-
stitutability and complementarity between private and public education.
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11 Introduction
The distribution of education across individuals has been one of the most studied
topics during the last two decades. Empirical and theoretical evidence con￿rms
that children whose parents are characterized by high level of income and high
human capital are more likely to be enrolled at university and have better higher
education attainments (see, e.g., Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Woessmann, 2004;
Blau, 1999; Shea, 2000; Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Plug and Vijverberg,
2001, 2003; Taubman, 2001; Blanden, Gregg and Manchin, 2003; Blandel and
Machin, 2004; Callender, 2003; Chevalier and Lanot, 2002; De Fraja, 2002;
Zanchi and Oliveira, 2003). Despite the fact the higher education inequality
has been largely con￿rmed in several countries, there are many doubts about
the existence of a policy for equality. In particular, there still exist concerns
about the real e⁄ect of a policy increasing public investment.
This paper shows that increasing public investment in the higher education
system is an e⁄ective policy to reduce the educational gap between students
from high and low income households. We develop a theoretical model in which
the educational attainment by the child is to be interpreted as human capital:
it depends on public schooling and investment in private education by abstract-
ing from parental education, students￿ability and the e⁄ort they exert while
at school. Private education includes time and private goods which increase
the individual human capital; therefore the student is supposed to receive both
public and private education. We assume that households are composed of one
altruistic parent and his child; the only way the parent can ￿nance the edu-
cational process of his child is to leave a monetary transfer. We consider this
transfer as a sort of bequest. The decision-makers are assumed to be two: the
parent and the child. The parent is the ￿rst mover and decides how to allo-
cate his income between the bequest and his own current consumption. In the
successive period the child receives public education and allocates his bequest
between consumption good and investment in private education.
The assumption that the investment in private education is decided by the
child di⁄erentiates our paper from the previous literature (Becker and Tomes
1986 and Nordblom 2003). We are aware that a model in which the private
investment is chosen by the parent is appropriate for the compulsory school but
it does not properly represent the educational process working at the university
level. The parents are often not able to ￿gure out the kind of educational support
the child attending university really needs to improve his level of education. This
di¢ culty could arise from the weak interaction between parents and academic
sta⁄ (as professors) characterizing the university system. In some countries
(such as Italy and the UK) the compulsory school guarantees frequent meetings
between parents and teachers, but these do not take place once children go to
university. Furthermore, the child￿ s age also matters. The student attending
compulsory school is quite young and needs the guidance of its parents, while
the student attending university is usually older and therefore able to choose by
himself the type of private educational investment he needs. In the latter case,
2the role of the parent is just to decide the amount of transfer according to the
own liquidity possibility
Nordblom (2003) shows that an increase in public schooling is not an e⁄ec-
tive policy to decrease the inequality between the education of rich and poor
students. She develops a model in which households are composed of one altru-
istic parent and his child. The education level of the child positively depends
on public schooling, parental investment and parental education (interpreted as
accumulated of human capital). Parental investment includes expenditure in
private education of the child (as additional bocks, computers, language courses
and private teaching) and a monetary transfer (bequest). In this model, public
and private education are assumed to be complements: an increase in pub-
lic investment raises the marginal productivity of parental private investment.
Nordblom de￿nes the rich and the poor households in the following way: the
rich one privately invests in the education of his child and leaves a bequest to
him, while the poor one privately invests without leaving bequest. This model
analyzes a highly stylized economy composed of one rich and one poor house-
hold. The level of education inequality is measured by the ratio between the
human capital of the poor and the rich student.
Nordblom ￿nds that an increase in public investment has an ambiguous e⁄ect
on the educational gap. This ambiguity arises from the behavior of poor parents.
In fact, further public expenditure makes the child richer with the result that
the poor parent may substitute private investment with their own consumption.
Because of this reaction, a policy increasing public spending could implies that
the human capital of the rich student increases more than the human capital of
the poor one.
We borrow the index of inequality from Nordblom and assume that the rich
child receives a positive bequest from the parent while the poor one does not
receive any direct monetary transfer. According to this de￿nition, the poor stu-
dent cannot invest either in private consumption or in private education there-
fore his education just depends on the public investment. We ￿nd that further
public investment unambiguously increases the human capital of the poor stu-
dent more than the human capital of the rich one. This result holds under
the assumptions of both complementarity and substitutability between private
and public education. When the public and private education are substitutes
or weak complements then, the rich parent reacts to higher public investment
by decreasing the bequest, and as consequence of this reduction the rich child
reduces the investment in private education.
The main message of our paper can be the following: increasing public in-
vestment in the higher education system is an e⁄ective policy for equality under
the assumptions of both complementarity and substitutability between private
and public education. This theoretical result is in line with the empirical studies
which con￿rm the substitutability between public and private education. This
paper provides a justi￿cation for all the policies which promote further public
investment in higher education system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the general
structure of the model. Section 3 de￿nes the equilibrium strategy. In Section
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The young parent works and has a
child
The parent decides to allocate his
income between private consumption
(x) and a bequest (b) to the child. The
child receives b, b>0
The parent dies. The child receives
public education and allocates the
bequest, if any between private good
and investment in additional education
The education process is
ended and the child
works, consumes and
dies at the end of the
period.
Figure 1
The sequence of events
4, we see if increasing public investment is an e⁄ective policy to increase the
equality between the educational attainment of the rich and the poor student.
Section 5 presents the main conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider an economy in which each household is composed of an altruistic
parent and his child. The parent is altruistic in the sense that he includes the
utility of the child in his own utility function. The sequence of the events is
presented in Figure 1.
At time t1, the parent is young, works and has a son. At time t2, he decides
to allocate his income between private consumption and a bequest to child. The
bequest is the only way parents a⁄ect the educational attainment of his son. At
period t3, the parent dies, in the meantime the child receives public education
and allocates all entire bequest between private consumption and investment in
additional education.
At time t4, the child enters the labour market. We consider a highly stylized
labour market in which the child immediately gets a job once his educational
process ends. The child consumes all his money earned in the labour market.
We rule out any opportunity of saving because at the end of period t4 the child
dies and does not have son to leave the bequest to.
The private education is to be interpreted as an investment in time and
private goods which increase the individual human capital. Therefore, the child
can simultaneously receive both private and (free) public education.
4The objective of the model is to study how a policy increasing public in-
vestment in higher education system a⁄ects the gap between the educational
attainment of the rich and the poor student .
2.1 The child
The child is born at time t1. He does not take any decisions until time t3; when
the parent dies. In fact, at time t2, he receives the bequest, if any, but does not
use it before time t3. At time t3, he uses all his bequest to consume a private
good or invest in private education. When the child decides the allocation of
his bequest he takes into account the level of free public education currently
provided by the public system. The investment in private education plays a
focal role in the model because, together with the level of public schooling, it
determines the amount of money the child will earn once he enters the labour
market. At time t3, the human capital of the child h depends on the level of
investment in public school E, and investment in private education I, according
to the following production function1:
h = f (I;E): (1)
Assumption 1 The level of public investment is equal for all children in the
economy.
Assumption 2 The production function f (:) is twice continuously di⁄eren-
tiable, increasing and concave in I and E , that is fI;fE > 0 and fII;fEE < 0.
Assumption 2 explains that the human capital positively depends on private
and public education. The sign of fIE and fEI, which are the cross derivatives
of the production function, strongly determines the results of the paper: if this
sign is negative (positive) the marginal productivity of each input is decreasing
(increasing) in the other one.
In the rest of the paper we study how an increase in public schooling a⁄ects
the gap between the educational attainment of the rich and the poor student
when fIE > 0 and fIE ￿ 0.
At time t3, the child can acquire the private good by using part of his bequest,
which of course implies less investment in private education and consequently a
lower level of human capital ceteris paribus.
At the end of time t3, the educational process ends, and at time t4 the child
enters the labour market. We assume that labour income ! is proportional to
the level of human capital, according to the following relationship:
1We assume neither the presence of innate ability nor correlation between a parent￿ s human
capital and his child￿ s. See (Nordblom 2003) for the correlation between a parent￿ s human
capital and his child￿ s.
5! = f (I;E): (2)
We normalize the wage to 1:
During the time t4, the child consumes all his labour income without saving
anything.
Now consider the maximization problem faced by the child at time t3. He
decides the level of private investment in education and consumption of private
good, given the value of his bequest b. When he takes his decision, the child
perfectly forecasts that the labour income he will receive at time t4 depends on
his current choices about the educational process and his bequest.
At time t3, utility function of the child is composed of the current utility of
private good z, and the discounted utility of future labour income. This function
is de￿ned as follows:
U (z;!) = v (z) + ￿u(!): (3)
Assumption 4 The functions v (z) and u(!) are twice continuously di⁄eren-
tiable and strictly concave.
The budget constraint for the child is:
z + pII = b (4)
where pI is the price of investment in private education, and the price of
private good is normalized to 1. Constraint (4) implies that, at time t3, the
child spends all his bequest.
2.2 The parent
At the beginning of time t2, the parent decides how to allocate his income
between current private consumption and a bequest for the child. The parent
is characterized by the parameter ￿ that measures his degree of altruism. The
utility function of the parent at time t2 is composed of the utility of private
good x, and the utility of the child. It is de￿ned as follows:
up (x) + ￿ [U (z (b;E);! (b;E))]; (5)
where the subscript p denotes the parent.
6Assumption 5 The function up (x) is strictly concave and twice di⁄erentiable.
If the parent were not altruistic (￿ = 0), then he would maximize just the
utility of his current consumption of private good. For the rest of the paper we
consider the case ￿ > 0.
At time t2, the parent￿ s budget constraint is the following:
x + b = Y (6)
The constraint (6) implies that the parent allocates all his income. The only
form of saving for the parent is the bequest.
3 The Equilibrium of the Game
In this section we characterize the sub-game equilibrium of the model by solving
backwards. We start from time t3 by solving the maximization problem of
the child, for a given value of his bequest. Then, we proceed by solving the
maximization problem of the parent.
3.1 Third period: the child




v (b ￿ pII) + ￿u(f (I;E)): (7)
The ￿rst order condition with respect to I is the following:
￿u0 (f (I;E))fI (:) = pIv0 (b ￿ pII); (8)
where v0 (:), u0 (:), denotes respectively the marginal utility of private good
z and future consumption. The factor fI (:) is the marginal productivity of
investment in private education.
The ￿rst order condition shows that at optimum the marginal cost of an
increase in I (in terms of reduction of z) equals the marginal bene￿t of such
increase (in terms of higher future consumption).
The optimal level of private education decided by the child at time t3 is
de￿ned as follows.
7De￿nition 1 The level of investment in private education, I￿ (b;E), satisfying
the ￿rst order condition (8) is de￿ned by the following expression:
I￿ (b;E) = argmax
I
v (b ￿ pII) + ￿u(f (I;E)): (9)
The optimal level of private education depends on the bequest and the public
education. After an exercise of comparative static on the ￿rst order condition
(8) we obtain the following results:
i) If public and private investment in education are substitutes, then an
increase in E implies a decrease in the optimal level of investment in private













If fIE (:) ￿ 0, then we have that
dI
￿(b;E)
dE < 0. When public and private
investment in education are substitutes, the child reacts to an increase in public
spending by unambiguously decreasing the level of investment in additional
education.
If fIE (:) > 0, then the sign of
dI
￿(b;E)
dE is ambiguous. When further public in-
vestment strongly increases the marginal productivity of the private investment,
then the child can react by increasing the spending in private education.
ii) An increase in b implies an increase in the optimal level of investment in














By looking at the result of comparative static and treating b and E as exoge-
nous parameter, we see that, the function I￿ (b;E) is increasing in the bequest
and decreasing in the public education. These ￿ndings show that if there is an
increase in public investment in the higher education system, then the optimal
response of the child receiving positive bequest is to substitute away from the
investment in private education to increase the consumption of the private good.
83.2 Second period: the parent
Substitute (6), and the child￿ s utility as in (7) into (5). At time t2, the maxi-
mization problem faced by the parent is now:
max
b
up (Y ￿ b) + ￿ [v (b ￿ pII￿ (b;E)) + ￿u(f (I￿ (b;E);E))]; (12)
s:t: b ￿ 0: (13)
The constraint (13) rules out the possibility to leave debt to the child.

















b ￿ 0; (15)
@Up
@b
b = 0; (16)
where u0
p (:) denotes the marginal utility of the parent with respect to private




p (Y ￿ b) + ￿v0 (b ￿ pII￿ (b;E)) ￿ 0; (17)
The ￿rst order condition (17) implies that at the interior solution the mar-
ginal bene￿t of an increase in b (in terms of higher consumption of private good
by the child) equals its marginal cost (in terms of a reduction of the private good
by the parent). In equilibrium, an altruistic parent in interior solution uses his
income both to consume private good and to leave a positive bequest. He in-
creases the transfer to the point where its marginal bene￿t equals its marginal
cost. The parent in corner solution does not leave anything to the child.
Let b b(E) be the chosen level of bequest of a parent to his son, given that:
i) the son will optimally choose I in stage 2, and ii) public investment is E.
With the following propositions we show how the level of bequest dependent
on the income household.
90
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Proposition 2 The highest income level such that a household is liquidity con-
strained increases with E if fIE (:) ￿ 0, while it presents an ambiguous trend
for fIE (:) > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that if public and private investment are substitutes,
then an increase in the public spending rises the highest income level such that
the household chooses a bequest equal to zero. Proposition 3 explains how the
optimal level of the bequest for the not liquidity constrained households depends
on the income.
Proposition 3 The optimal level of the bequest chosen by the not liquidity con-
strained households is increasing in the income.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 says that for the not liquidity constrained households higher
income level implies higher bequest. We represent this relationship in ￿gure 2.
The increasing part of the function b1 represents the optimal level of bequest
for each level of income higher than the highest level (Y1) such that the household
are liquidity constrained. In this case we are assuming the public and private
education are substitutes. Now consider an increase in the public spending such
that the income threshold shifts from Y1 to Y2. As ￿gure 2 illustrates, higher
public investment shifts the bequest function on the right (toward b2). The
households with an income between Y1 and Y2 become liquidity constrained just
10once the increase in public investment has occurred. In the absence of public
policy these households have decided to leave a relatively low level of bequest,
therefore even a small increase in public investment is enough to convince them
to remove the transfer to the child. The households which, in the absence of
policy, have income higher than Y2, continue to leave a positive bequest to the
child even after the public investment has increased. For these households the
rise in public spending is not so strong to motivate a removal of the bequest.
Finally, the households with an income lower than Y1 are liquidity con-
strained before and after the increase in public investment. Children from these
households always bene￿t from higher public spending because the only way
they have to improve their level of education is the public policy.
In the next section we focus on the relationship between private investment
in human capital and public education, and study the e⁄ect of an exogenous
increase in public schooling on the equilibrium strategies.
4 Public education and human capital
Following Nordblom (2003), we assume a very simple economy composed of two
households: one is liquidity constrained and the other is not. We refer to the
former as the rich household and to the latter as the poor one.
The poor and the rich child have di⁄erent levels of human capital because,
at time t2, the poor one does not receive a bequest and can neither invest in
private education nor consume private good.
4.1 Inequality and human capital
We borrow the inequality index from Nordblom (2003) and assume the case of
the altruistic parent and thrifty child (￿ > 0). The inequality index is de￿ned
as follows:
De￿nition 4 The gap between the educational attainment of the rich and poor











Now, let us assume that there is an exogenous increase in public investment.
Such more public investment is free for the households. Furthermore, to rule
out the scenario in which all the households are liquidity constrained we assume
that the income of the rich household is su¢ ciently higher than the highest
income level such that the household leaves no bequest.
The e⁄ect of such policy on the inequality can be obtained by deriving the
index in (18) with respect to E.
11Proposition 5 If the public and private investment in education are substitutes
or the marginal productivity of each one does not depend on the other, then
increasing public investment decreases the level of educational gap.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since we are analyzing the case of substitutability between public and private
investments, then for the rest of the proof we assume fIE (I;E) < 0:
Firstly, we state the condition for increased public education to decrease




Once calculated the partial derivative of the index (18), we rewrite the con-














f(0;E) > 1, after simple algebra, we show that the su¢ cient condi-








dE = fI￿ (I￿ (:);E)
dI
￿(b b(E);E)
dE +fE (I￿ (:);E); we rewrite the
(21) as follows:







2Where fE (0;E) is the partial derivative of the production function f (0;E) with respect
to E, and
df(I;E)
dE is the total derivative of the function f (I;E) with respect to E:
3We recall that f￿
I (I￿ (:);E) and fE (I￿ (:);E), are respectively the partial derivative of
the production function f (I￿ (:);E) with respect to I￿ and E.




























2 v00 (:) + ￿u0fI￿I￿ (:)
: (24)
For fIE (I;E) < 0 and by lemma 6, we have the following results: i) the left
hand side of (22) is positive, and ii) given
db b(E)




Since, part ii) implies that the right hand side is negative, then the condition
(22) holds.
For fIE (I;E) = 0 and by Lemma 6, we have the following results: i) the
left hand side is zero, and ii) given
db b(E)
dE < 0, then
dI
￿(b b(E);E)
dE < 0. Hence, even
in this case the condition (22) holds.
￿
Proposition 5 shows that if public and private education are substitutes
(fIE (I;E) < 0) or the marginal productivity of each input does not depend on
the other (fIE (I;E) = 0), then an increasing public investment is an e⁄ective
policy to increase the equality between the educational attainment of the rich
and the poor student.
Consider the case fIE (I;E) < 0. Higher public investment has a positive
e⁄ect on the human capital of both the rich and the poor child. However, the
human capital of the poor student increases more than the human capital of the
rich one. The reason for this result is explained by two mechanisms working on
condition (22). Firstly, the rich parent reacts to the increase in public investment
by decreasing the bequest and, as consequence of this reduction, the rich child
reduces his private investment in education. Secondly, the positive direct e⁄ect
of public education on human capital is stronger for the poor student than for
the rich one.
So far we have shown that if public and private education are substitutes and
the investment in private education is decided by the child, then more public
investments unambiguously increase the level of equality between the human
capital of the rich and the poor student.
Now consider fIE (I;E) = 0. In this case the marginal productivity of public
(private) investment does not depend on the private (public) one. In this case
the direct e⁄ect of increasing public investment on the human capital is the









dE . See the Appendix for the proof of
the Lemma
13education by the rich child is the main reason for the human capital of the poor
student to increase more than human capital of the rich one.
Nordblom (2003) ￿nds that an increase in public schooling has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on the educational gap. She develops a model in which public and private
education are complements and the private investment in education is decided
by the parent.
We show that even for a low degree of complementarity higher public in-
vestment unambiguously decreases the educational gap between poor and rich
students.
Proposition 7 If public and private education are weakly complements, then
higher public investment still implies a decrease in the educational gap.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 says that further public investment implies that the human
capital of the poor student increases more than the human capital of the rich one,
even for a low degree of complementarity. To see that, consider condition (22).
For a low degree of complementarity the rich parent still reacts to increasing
public investment by decreasing the bequest. This reduction still implies that
the rich child reduces his investment in private education.
Hence, the positive direct e⁄ect a further public investment has on the human
capital of the rich child is compensated by the negative indirect e⁄ect arising
from the reduction of the private investment.
5 Concluding remarks
Empirical evidence shows that children whose parents are characterized by high
level of income and high human capital are more likely to be enrolled at univer-
sity and also have better higher education attainments.
This paper shows that a policy increasing public investment in the higher
education system e⁄ectively decreases the educational gap between the poor
and the rich student. This conclusion holds in a model in which the decision
makers are both the parent and the child. The altruistic parent as ￿rst mover
allocates his income between a monetary transfer for the child and private own
consumption. In the successive period the child receives public education and
decides how to spend the transfer between private consumption and investment
in private education. We allow the child to bene￿t from both private and public
education because the private one includes time and goods invested increasing
the human capital.
We assume that the rich child receives a positive transfer by the parent
while the poor one does not receive any transfer and therefore his education
just depends on the public investment. Following Nordblom (2003) we model
an economy composed of one rich and one poor household and measure the
14educational inequality as the ratio between the educational achievement of the
poor and the rich student.
The determinant of our ￿nding is the behavior of the rich parent and his
child. In fact, once the public spending has increased, the rich parents react by
decreasing the transfer. Because of this reduction, the rich child decreases the
investment in private education. This lower private investment implies that the
educational level of the poor student increases more that the level of the rich
one.
The qualitative results of our paper hold under the assumptions of both sub-
stitutability and weak complementarity between private and public education.
The presence of two decision-makers and the validity of our result even under
complementarity di⁄erentiate our model from the previous literature. We are
aware that a model with two decision-makers in which the private investment is
chosen by the child is more appropriate for representing the educational process
working at the university level.
Nordblom (2003) is the most recent theoretical work studying the impact
of increasing public investment on the educational gap. She shows that if the
public and private investment are complements and the latter is only decided by
an altruistic parent, then higher public spending has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the
education inequality. This is because once the public investment has increased,
the income e⁄ect makes the child richer with the consequence that the poor
parent may substitute private investment with personal consumption.
Our conclusions show that the degree of complementarity between public and
private education could not be the main determinant of the e⁄ect the policy
increasing public investment has on the educational gap in higher education
system.
Further theoretical research should analyze the e⁄ectiveness of such policy
by constructing a general equilibrium model and to introduce a tax system to
￿nance the increasing level of public spending. The fact that the investment in
private education is chosen by the student clearly determines the main result of
the paper; further empirical research should investigate the magnitude of this
phenomenon.
15APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition (2)
Let us denote the foc (17) as F (b;E;Y ) such that:
F (b;E;Y ) = ￿u0
p (Y ￿ b) + ￿v0 (b ￿ pII￿ (b;E)); (25)









dY = 0: (26)
Since we are computing the level highest income such that the households












Given (10), we know that the following results hold: i) if fIE (:) ￿ 0, then
dY
dE > 0, ii) if fIE (:) > 0, then the sign of dY
dE is ambiguous.
￿
Proof of Proposition 3.
We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2 and obtain:

















because, given the value of
dI
￿(b;E)












I + ￿u00 (:)(fI (:))
2 + ￿u0fII
￿ > 0: (29)
￿
16Proof of Lemma 6.
Since we know that I￿ (:) directly and through b b(E) depends on E, we need
to ￿nd the value of
db b(E)
dE : To do that, we rewrite the ￿rst order condition of the









































































































2 v00 (:) + ￿u0fI￿I￿ (:)
￿: (35)


























2 v00 (:) + ￿u0fI￿I￿ (:)
: (37)
For fIE (:) ￿ 0, we have
db b(E)





Proof of Proposition 7.
Proposition 5 showed that the increase in public schooling decreases the
educational gap for fIE (:) < 0 and fIE (:) = 0: Hence, there exists a value
" > 0 approaching zero and a degree of complementarity fIE (:), such that
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